Análisis de la transparencia organizacional y el poder económico a partir la teoría de juegos

Milton Samuel Camelo Rincón

doi:10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/empresa/a.7086

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Análise da transparência organizacional e o poder econômico a partir da teoria de jogos

DOI: https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/empresa/a.7086

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Publicado: ene. 9, 2020

Edição: v. 22 n. 38 (2020)

Seção Artigos

Palavras-chave: Transparencia organizacional , Poder económico , Teoría de juegos , Teoría de la agencia Organizational transparency , economic power , game theory , agency theory. transparência organizacional , Poder econômico , Teoria de jogos , Teoria da agência

Autores

Milton Samuel Camelo Rincón Universidad de La Salle

Resumo

Este artigo tem como objetivo propor uma estrutura teórica que vincule os conceitos de transparência organizacional e poder econômico, de forma que sirva como base para novos estudos empíricos. Metodologicamente, a proposta parte de uma revisão de literatura, onde se faz evidente uma extensa agenda de pesquisa sobre os temas em questão, mas também a ausência de um referente teórico que os relacione explicitamente. Com base no anterior, se desenvolve uma análise hipotética utilizando como ferramenta a teoria de jogos, onde se supõem diferentes cenários em função da informação disponível e a estrutura de pagamentos dos agentes. O exercício mostra que um excessivo grau de poder econômico pode propiciar decisões que são contrárias à transparência organizacional, afetando a tomada de decisões dos grupos de interesse e o desenvolvimento social. Adicionalmente, infere-se que quanto mais forte sejam as medidas sancionatórias por parte do Estado e a Sociedade, maior possibilidade de transparência, destacando a necessidade de gerar mecanismos institucionais que propiciem a cooperação dentro das organizações.

Biografia do Autor

Milton Samuel Camelo Rincón, Universidad de La Salle

Magister en Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Especialista en Estadística, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Economista, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Profesor investigador, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, Universidad de La Salle.

Como Citar

Camelo Rincón, M. S. (2020). Análise da transparência organizacional e o poder econômico a partir da teoria de jogos. Revista Universidad Y Empresa, 22(38), 257–278. https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/empresa/a.7086

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