Analysis of Organizational Transparency and Economic Power Based on Game Theory

DOI:  https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/empresa/a.7086

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Published: Jan 9, 2020
Issue: Vol. 22 No. 38 (2020)
Section Articles


Keywords: Transparencia organizacional , Poder económico , Teoría de juegos , Teoría de la agencia Organizational transparency , economic power , game theory , agency theory. transparência organizacional , Poder econômico , Teoria de jogos , Teoria da agência

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Authors

  Milton Samuel Camelo Rincón Universidad de La Salle
Abstract

The objective of this article is to propose a theorical structure that links the concepts of organizational transparencyand economic power in a way that sets a base for new empirical studies. Methodologically, the proposal starts from a literature review, where an extensive research agenda on the issues in question is evident, but also the absence of a theoretical reference that explicitly relates them. Based on the above, a hypothetical analysis is developed using the game theory as a tool, where different scenarios are assumed based on the available information and the agents’ payment structure. The exercise shows that an excessive degree of economic power can lead to decisions that are contrary to organizational transparency, affecting the decision making of interest groups and social development. Additionally, it is inferred that the stronger the sanctioning measures by the state and society, the more the possibility of transparency, highlighting the need to generate institutional mechanisms that foster cooperation within organizations.

Author Biography

Milton Samuel Camelo Rincón, Universidad de La Salle

Magister en Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Especialista en Estadística, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Economista, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Profesor investigador, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, Universidad de La Salle.
How to Cite
Camelo Rincón, M. S. (2020). Analysis of Organizational Transparency and Economic Power Based on Game Theory. Revista Universidad Y Empresa, 22(38), 257–278. https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/empresa/a.7086
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