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Pablo López-Silva

Introducción: El delirio constituye uno de los síntomas más complejos y severos de la psicosis. Uno de los problemas más fundamentales que actualmente enfrenta la investigación en el campo de la neuropsiquiatría actual tiene que ver con el desafío de producir teorías explicativas para la producción de este tipo de estado mental, a lo que denomino ‘al problema etiológico de los delirios psicóticos’. Desarrollo: Se analiza críticamente las principales alternativas dentro de la neuropsiquiatría contemporánea al problema etiológico. Conclusión: El análisis indica que las tres teorías fundamentales que conviven en la actualidad poseen problemas para progresar en el desafío de explicar la etiología de los delirios. Por lo anterior, se propone la idea de que, a la luz del estado actual del debate, la hibridación teórica podría perfilarse como el mejor candidato metodológico para generar progreso real en la disciplina.

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