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Hernan Herrera-Eceheverri

Esta propuesta utiliza el caso del Antigüo Grupo Empresarial Bavaria para analizar tres aspectos relacionados con la diversificación no relacionada y el proceso de spin off de las firmas. Primero se establece que las empresas con unidades de negocio caracterizadas por excesos de liquidez, se diversifican de manera no relacionada, debido a que la existencia de un mercado interno de capitales les permite derribar sus restricciones de financiación e incrementar la rentabilidad corporativa. Segundo, se demuestra que la decisión de diversificación de un gerente corporativo es inversamente proporcional a la magnitud del costo esperado por la dilución de esfuerzo del gerente de la nueva unidad de negocio. Finalmente, se muestra cómo la diversificación no relacionada presenta un límite en su contribución al incremento de la rentabilidad corporativa, en cuyo caso se puede inducir la decisión de realizar un spin off para delimitar, especializar y mejorar la calidad de las decisiones de asignación de recursos. Se concluye que lo anterior puede explicar por qué en algunos grupos económicos se observan ciclos de diversificación y ciclos de enfoque. Cuando el grupo económico desea incrementar la rentabilidad inicia su proceso de diversificación; una vez llega al umbral que hace que la probabilidad de acierto en sus decisiones de inversión se reduzca, empieza nuevamente su proceso de enfoque, realizando separación de sus unidades no relacionadas. Este ciclo se puede repetir en el desarrollo histórico de un grupo empresarial.

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Herrera-Eceheverri, H. (2018). Decisión de diversificación y decisión de Spin-off. Ciclos de expansión y ciclos de enfoque: Analisis retrospectivo de las evidencias del caso Bavaria. Revista Universidad Y Empresa, 21(36), 228-260. https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/empresa/a.6649

Hernan Herrera-Eceheverri, Universidad Eafit

Hernan Herrera-Echeverri:  Is a Professor at Universidad EAFIT in the area of Corporate Finance.Director of the Master in Financial Administration (MAF) at Universidad EAFIT in Medellin. He is Ph.D in Management, Finance concentration at Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia and visiting researcher at FIU (Florida International University) United States. He received his Master in Management at Universidad de los Andes. He is Specialist in Finance at Universidad EAFIT in Medellin-Colombia and Specialist in project management at Universidad Javeriana, Cali, Colombia. He graduated in System Engineering from the Universidad San Buenaventura de Colombia. He has been board member of several firms in Colombia. His research interests are related to topics in corporate finance, private equity, venture capital and corporate governance.

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