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Francisco Jaime Ibáñez Hernández
Miguel Ángel Peña Cerezo
Andrés Araujo de la Mata

El presente trabajo se centra en el análisis de la relación entre las políticas crediticias de las entidades de crédito y el desempeño de las mismas ex-post. Tras llevar a cabo una revisión de la teoría se plantea como hipótesis de trabajo la relación entre la intensidad en el crecimiento de la cartera crediticia de los bancos en las fases de expansión crediticia, y su desempeño ex-post. Los resultados preliminares presentados confi rman nuestra hipótesis: las entidades que más desvían su crecimiento crediticio respecto del crecimiento del PIB nominal están sujetas a un peor comportamiento en cuanto a la evolución posterior de sus benefi cios, rentabilidades e insolvencias.

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