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Esta pesquisa estima as tarifas de acesso em redes de transações com cartões de pagamento sob uma estrutura de firma verticalmente integrada. A partir de um modelo teórico baseado em Willig (1979) e Baumol (1983), e complementado por Armstrong et al. (1996), os resultados mostram que, ao aumentar a diferenciação horizontal entre as empresas, a tarifa diminui, independentemente de as empresas serem simétricas ou diferenciadas, ou de os preços serem regulados ou não. O modelo sugere uma tarifa teórica média de US$ 0,01 por transação, notavelmente superior aos US$ 0,022 por minuto de acesso na telefonia móvel, embora não existam tarifas comparáveis nessa indústria.

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