Bureaucratic corruption and economic growth

There is an ostensible diversity of corruption incidence rate across countries, stages of economic development and political and economic regimes.  However, the theoretical or empirical literature on the relation between corruption, government and growth is scarce.  We try to fill this gap using endogenous-growth models of equilibrium, in which the agents are allowed to be either homogeneous or members of the bureacratic and working class. The "balanced growth" is derived as a permanent substitution between the accrual of human capital, which generate growth; and in political capital, which mainly ensures bureaucratic power. We focus on the interaction between these two types of capital and their implications for the stages of develoment and long-term growth under different degrees of gubernmental intervention in the economy and alternative political regimes.  We find consistency of specific propositions with the empirical evidence based on a panel of 152 countries between 1960-1992.