Externalities in Academic Achievement from the Presence of Prior Beneficiaries: Evidence from the program “Ser Pilo Paga”

DOI:  https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/economia/a.6454

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Published: Feb 13, 2018
Issue: Vol. 20 No. 2 (2017): julio-diciembre
Section Articles


Keywords: Academic performance Externalities Incentives Ser Pilo Paga.

Main Article Content

Authors

Sergio Arango
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana

Abstract

In October 2014, the Colombian government announced that it was granting ten thousand scholarships to low-income students to study at institutions of higher education. This paper examines the effect on eligibility for the program, based on 2015 Saber 11 achievement test results, in schools with and without program beneficiaries after the first wave of scholarships was granted. Using a differences in differences model, it was found that overall test scores of eligible students in schools with beneficiaries increased, and their reading scores increased by 0.03 standard deviations. In mathematics their scores increased
by 0.02 standard deviations. In schools without prior beneficiaries, eligibility represented an increase of 0.09 standard deviations in the overall test score and in math, while in reading the increase was 0.08 standard deviations. These results suggest the existence of externalities in the students of schools that did not have beneficiaries of the program in the first year of incentives.

How to Cite
Arango, S. (2018). Externalities in Academic Achievement from the Presence of Prior Beneficiaries: Evidence from the program “Ser Pilo Paga”. Revista Economía Del Rosario, 20(2), 175–212. https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/economia/a.6454
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