Prosecution of Justice in a Libertarian Community

This article critically examines the state monopoly on the administration of justice from a historical, economic, and libertarian perspective. Historically, there have been alternative systems in which the administration of justice has been private; however, it is unclear what implications applying these principles would have for current systems, given the complex characteristics of contemporary society. The authors respond to this gap by combining historical analysis of the Anglo-Saxon case with tools from economic theory to examine the institutional incentives that emerge in monopolistic systems. Methodologically, a critical analysis of texts is carried out, in which economic theory is  subsequently contrasted with empirical data from the Mexican case, revealing an inefficient state justice system with poor practices. The main findings include that the state system generates perverse incentives, where prosecutors
maximize personal objectives and resources are not rationally allocated to their most valuable uses. The
importance of this work lies in the justification and proposal of a viable alternative: the privatization of justice, which recognizes the right of victims to restitution and allows for multiple modalities to achieve greater efficiency and results oriented toward substantive justice for victims.