The Relationship between the IMF and Borrowing Governments in a Theoretical Viewpoint. The Contribution of IPE Centered on Interests

DOI:  https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/desafios/a.6140

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Published: Jul 1, 2019
Issue: Vol. 31 No. 2 (2019): (julio-diciembre) Emociones, movilización social y política
Section General Section


Keywords: IMF , borrowing governments , interests , relative autonomy. FMI , gobiernos prestatarios , intereses , autonomía relativa FMI , governos mutuários , interesses , autonomia relativa.

Main Article Content

Authors

  Pablo Nemiña
Abstract

The ability to provide financial assistance along with its role as auditor and guarantor of economic programs provides the International Monetary Fund (imf) with an important power resource when intervening countries that face external imbalances. Regardless, the mere imposition of policies of the imf over the borrowing governments does not characterize their relationship, neither that the imf invariably shows dissatisfaction with the countries' non-compliance. This paper proposes a theoretical contribution for analyzing the relationship between the imf and the borrowing governments based on the International Political Economy’s (ipe) contributions about the incidence of the interests of world power countries and the financial sector, bureaucracies, and domestic actors of the country. The framework of analysis also considers the contributions of the constructivist sociological theory about the characterization of the imf and the borrowing governments as social actors, the restrictive and enabling character that structures have over the agency, and their implications for autonomy.

How to Cite
Nemiña, P. (2019). The Relationship between the IMF and Borrowing Governments in a Theoretical Viewpoint. The Contribution of IPE Centered on Interests. Desafíos, 31(2), 341–373. https://doi.org/10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/desafios/a.6140
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