Ballots or Bullets? Investigating Youth Disposition and Drivers of Election-Related Violence in Southwestern Nigeria

Introduction

Election-related violence is still a persistent threat to democratic consolidation in many developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where political transitions are often turbulent and fiercely contested. Nigeria, despite over two decades of uninterrupted democratic practice, continues to witness cyclical outbreaks of violence before, during, and after elections (Von-Borzyskowski, & Kuhn, 2020). At the center of this disturbing trend are the youth who are both key actors and casualties. Their roles in election-related violence manifests in political thuggery to ballot snatching, intimidation of voters, and post-election unrest among others. This has raised critical concerns about their political disposition and the structural dynamics that shape their engagement with the democratic process (Omoniyi, 2025). Elections are fundamental to democratic governance, serving as the primary means by which citizens choose their leaders and influence public policies.

However, the credibility and integrity of electoral processes across the world have often been undermined by violence. Globally, election-related violence (ERV) has emerged as a recurrent feature in fragile democracies and conflict-prone societies. According to Yiaga Africa (2020), over 60 countries experienced election-related violence between 2010 and 2020, ranging from intimidation and harassment to targeted killings and widespread civil unrest. Such violence not only erodes public trust in democratic institutions but also stifles civic participation and suppresses dissenting voices (Omoniyi, 2023; Ibrahim & Ibeanu 2009). In extreme cases, it derails democratic consolidation and plunges societies into long-term instability. The causes of ERV vary widely across contexts, but common triggers include ethnic tensions, weak institutions, corruption, political exclusion, and a winner-takes-all political culture. In sub-Saharan Africa, elections are often perceived as zero-sum contests, where the cost of losing is politically and economically unbearable.

Studies by Awofeso & Odeyemi (2014) and Bekoe (2011) have shown how this perception drives political elites and their supporters to manipulate electoral processes or use violence to secure victory. Furthermore, youth unemployment and poor civic education contribute significantly to the recruitment of young people as instruments of violence. Political actors exploit their vulnerability and frustration, offering them monetary or material incentives to foment chaos and intimidate opponents during elections. In recent years, technological advancements and social media platforms have further complicated the dynamics of election-related violence (Akinboye, 2005; Omoniyi, 2025). While these tools can promote transparency and citizen engagement, they also serve as channels for misinformation, incitement, and mobilization for violent acts. For example, the 2007 post-election crisis in Kenya, which resulted in the deaths of over 1,100 people and displacement of hundreds of thousands, was partly fueled by ethnically charged narratives circulated through SMS and radio broadcasts (Eme & Ibietan, 2012).

Similarly, in Myanmar's 2020 general elections, digital platforms were used to marginalize ethnic minorities and justify military crackdowns. These examples underscore the changing nature of ERV and the urgent need for comprehensive strategies to mitigate its risks. While successive elections have shown improvements in electoral administration and technology adoption, they have also been marred by violence and impunity. The 2003 general elections were notoriously violent, resulting in hundreds of deaths across several states. Similar patterns were seen in the 2007, 2011, and 2019 elections, especially in hotspots like Rivers, Kaduna, Borno, and Kano States. According to data from the IDEA (2021) and Von-Borzyskowski & Kuhn (2020), over 1,200 incidents of election-related violence occurred between 2015 and 2019, with youths being the primary actors and victims in most cases. This trend reflects the deep-seated structural and institutional weaknesses in Nigeria's political architecture. Studies like Nwangwu & Onah (2019) and Weghorst, & Lindberg, (2011) have explained youth involvement to a range of socio-economic factors chief among them, unemployment, poverty, and elite manipulation.

However, these explanations, though plausible, tend to be reductionist and insufficiently interrogated. This is because not all unemployed or poor youths engage in election-related violence, and not all acts of violence are externally sponsored. In the same vein, some youths voluntarily participate in violence out of political conviction, group loyalty, or perceived injustice. This raises a critical gap in knowledge and why do some youths gravitate toward violence during elections while others reject it, despite facing similar socio-economic and political conditions? The answer to this remains elusive. This is because the current studies fail to offer a context-specific analysis of youth dispositions and factors driving them into violence. It is discovered that while the nation's policy frameworks and electoral reforms have focused heavily on curbing physical manifestations of election-related violence through security deployment, voting technology, and legal penalties among others, little attention has been paid to addressing the underlying drivers of youth involvement.

It is also explained that subject-based civic education, social studies and associated moral instruction interventions are often top-down, generic, and fail to account for the informal socialization processes that shape youth political behavior at community levels. Moreover, the voices, experiences, and perspectives of the youth themselves are frequently absent in the design of election-related violence prevention programs. Globally, scholarly debates are also divided. While some studies emphasize structural factors like marginalization and institutional failure, others stress the agency of young people and the social meanings they attach to political violence. Yet, there is limited consensus on which factors carry the most weight, or how they interact in specific situation like Nigeria where ethnic, religious, digital, and economic dynamics coalesce in difficult ways during electoral cycles. Therefore, this study becomes imperative. It seeks to explore the disposition of Nigerian youths toward election-related violence and interrogate the factors that predispose them to such actions.

It is discovered that there are several interlocking factors contributing to the persistence of ERV in Nigeria. First, the electoral process is often characterized by a lack of transparency, vote-buying, logistical failures, and legal ambiguities. These issues diminish public confidence and provide justifications for violent contestation. Second, political godfatherism and elite manipulation have entrenched a culture of impunity where violent actors are rarely prosecuted. Third, socio-economic disparities and mass unemployment, particularly among the youth, create a fertile ground for recruitment into political thuggery. Research by Nwangwu & Onah (2019) revealed that 68% of youth involved in Election-related Violence in Southwest Nigeria were unemployed and lacked formal civic education. The convergence of these factors makes violence a rational choice for some actors seeking political advantage. For instance, Nwangwu and Onuoha (2022) conducted a mixed-method study on Election-related Violence in Imo and Rivers States, revealing that lack of police neutrality and judicial delay in electoral litigation significantly contribute to citizens' resort to self-help and violent protests.

In another study, Orji & Uzodi (2012) observed that political parties deliberately fund and train armed groups during pre-election campaigns, only to disband or abandon them after elections, thereby fueling cycles of violence and criminality. These findings explain the need for electoral reforms that go beyond voting procedures to address systemic incentives for violence. In terms of response, both state and non-state actors have made concerted efforts to curb Election-related Violence in Nigeria. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has introduced innovations like the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS), electronic transmission of results, and voter education programs aimed at promoting transparency and reducing conflict triggers. Civil society organizations such as the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) and Yiaga Africa have also played pivotal roles through election monitoring, peacebuilding initiatives, and civic sensitization.

However, these efforts often lack sustainability due to limited funding, political interference, and weak inter-agency coordination. Moreover, the Nigerian police and security forces have been criticized for partisanship, delayed response, and sometimes excessive use of force. It is equally important to consider the psychological and social consequences of election-related violence on communities. Victims often suffer trauma, displacement, and long-term distrust of political institutions. In conflict-affected zones like parts of Zamfara and Plateau States, residents have become disillusioned with democratic processes, leading to voter apathy and reduced civic engagement. Young people, particularly those who have been used as political thugs, are often abandoned post-election, with no rehabilitation or reintegration programs. This perpetuates cycles of violence, criminality, and social marginalization. Addressing ERV, therefore, requires not just legal or electoral interventions but also psychosocial support and community rebuilding efforts.

In nutshell, election-related violence remains a significant threat to democratic development globally, and particularly in Nigeria where structural fragility, elite impunity, and youth vulnerability intersect to fuel violent outcomes. While the manifestations of ERV differ across regions, its impacts, ranging from loss of life to democratic regression, are universally harmful.

The Nigerian case illustrates how electoral processes can be hijacked by violent logics when political competition is not underpinned by institutional trust, civic culture, and economic inclusion. Original empirical findings and policy reviews point to the need for systemic reform, civic reorientation, and deliberate investment in democratic infrastructure if the tide of election-related violence is to be reversed. Globally, young people represent one of the most dynamic, visible, and contested demographics in political transitions (Falana, 2018). In both emerging and established democracies, youths have consistently played significant roles during electoral cycles. This is because voters, observers, campaigners, and regrettably, as perpetrators and victims of violence.

The disposition of youth toward election-related violence is seen as attitudinal, behavioral, and psychological inclination to support or engage in electoral conflict (Usman, 2009). This is gaining increased academic attention, particularly in politically unstable or transitional states. While youth engagement is often hailed as a democratic asset, growing empirical evidence suggests that large segments of the youth population in fragile political systems are becoming increasingly inclined toward election-related confrontation and aggression. In Nigeria, the narrative is both familiar and troubling. Electoral periods frequently witness the mobilization of young people for disruptive acts which range from ballot box snatching and voter intimidation to attacks on political opponents and security personnel. This disposition does not emerge in a vacuum. It is often shaped by a mix of social disillusionment, identity politics, institutional distrust, and perceived political exclusion.

Findings from post-election assessments in Nigeria's 2011, 2015, and 2019 general elections reveal a worrying pattern of youth involvement in both orchestrated and spontaneous election-related violence, especially in urban slums, semi-urban centers, and conflict-prone rural zones. Many of these youths, according to Albert (2007), view violence as a justifiable means to "protect the mandate" or "punish betrayal" by the state. This disposition is also deeply tied to historical and generational patterns of political alienation. This is because several Nigerian youths have grown up in an environment where elections are seen as contests of power and manipulation rather than instruments of legitimate representation. It is to be noted that decades of political impunity, elite marginalization, and economic stagnation have produced widespread cynicism among young people who increasingly view elections as exclusive affairs reserved for the wealthy and well-connected. In such a situation, the attraction to violence is not merely material, it is symbolic as well as an act of protest or assertion of agency in a system that offers limited formal participation.

To buttress, group dynamics and peer influence further complicate this disposition. In many local situations, political identity is constructed within peer groups, informal neighborhood associations, or cult-like gangs. Within these structures, engaging in election-related violence becomes not just a political act, but a cultural norm, a performance of loyalty and masculinity. Research by Okafor and Olurode (2021) found that in certain communities, youth groups derived respect and political access by demonstrating capacity to 'secure' their territories during elections. Thus, violence becomes a socially endorsed behavior, rather than a deviation from it. Yet, it is critical to avoid overgeneralizing or pathologizing youth as inherently violent. This is because not all Nigerian youths support or participate in election-related violence. Many are vocal proponents of peacebuilding, civic awareness, and electoral integrity. A typical example that can buttress a point is that of groups like Yiaga Africa, Connected Development (CODE), and the #NotTooYoungToRun movement demonstrate that youths can and do play constructive roles in electoral reform and democratic deepening.

This contradiction between violent and peaceful dispositions explains the heterogeneity within Nigeria's youth population. It also outlines the importance of interrogating the enabling conditions that push some youths toward violence lowing others to resist it. Moreover, in the digital age, online spaces have become powerful arenas for shaping youth political behavior. In addition, social media platforms, while enabling civic mobilization, also serve as accelerants for political misinformation, ethnic hatred, and mobilization for electoral conflict. For instance, during the 2023 general elections, several digitally driven disinformation campaigns directly targeted young voters, inciting suspicion, outrage, and in some cases, retaliatory violence. The convergence of youth identity, digital media, and fragile electoral systems thus requires renewed scholarly focus and policy innovation. While the violent disposition of certain youth groups during elections is well documented, the precise factors that predispose youths to election-related violence remain a subject of considerable debate in both global and Nigerian scholarship.

Although researchers such as Olarinmoye (2008) and Paden (2008) have often invoked concepts like poverty, unemployment, political manipulation, or identity conflict to explain youth involvement in violence, the causal pathways remain unclear. In the same vein, no singular theory or model has gained consensus on the centrality of what causes youth to engage in election-related violence. The lack of clarity has significant implications for policy design and violence prevention strategies, hence, this study.

Results

Discussion of Findings

Conclusion

In conclusion, while youth disposition toward election-related violence is a visible and measurable concern in Nigeria and many developing democracies, the factors that predispose them to such behavior remain deeply ambiguous and contested. Explanations grounded in unemployment, political manipulation, civic ignorance, or identity politics offer partial insight but lack the nuance and empirical consistency needed for effective policy design. There is a pressing need for deeper, youth-centered, context-specific, and interdisciplinary research to interrogate these predispositions. Until then, efforts to prevent election-related violence may continue to treat symptoms rather than causes, failing to unravel the complex motivations that drive some youths toward the path of election-related violence while others resist it altogether.